Book Reviews by Sunderland, Edson R et al.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 16 Issue 1 
1917 
Book Reviews 
Edson R. Sunderland 
University of Michigan Law School 
Willard Barbour 
University of Michigan Law School 
Horace LaFayette Wilgus 
University of Michigan Law School 
Edgar N. Durfee 
University of Michigan Law School 
Edwin C. Goddard 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Other Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edson R. Sunderland, Willard Barbour, Horace L. Wilgus, Edgar N. Durfee & Edwin C. Goddard, Book 
Reviews, 16 MICH. L. REV. 62 (1917). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol16/iss1/6 
 
This Book Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
BOOK REVIEWS 
THE Ruu-MAKING AUTHORITY IN THE ENGLISH SUPREME CouRT, by Samuel 
Rosenbaum. Boston, The Boston Book Co., 1917, pp. xiv, 321. 
This volume is the fourth in the Unh'.ersity of Pennsylvania Law School 
Series, and is the work of a fellow of that school during the years 1913-1915. 
In common with the other books of the series, its object is- to aid the scientific 
study of legal problems and to help to improve the law. No subject, surely, 
is more worthy of presentation to American readers than this, and none 
is more full of important suggestions for the improvement of our practice. 
American pleading and practice is in a very chaotic condition. We have 
every variety represented among our States and further variations in the 
federal eourts. Some systems give reasonable satisfaction. Most of them do 
not. The Code, after two-thirds of a century of experiment, has not realized 
the hopes of its friends, and for many years no new recruit has joined the 
ranks of the Code States. The difficulty with the Code is its inflexibility, 
due to the fact that it is a system of legislative rather than judicial rules. 
The common law itself did not tie the hands of the courts so completely as 
do the provisions of the Code. And most of those American States which 
have not adopted the Code are provided with some other system of legis-
lative rules of practice no less rigid and mandatory. 
Recently, under the leadership of New Jersey, the question of freeing 
the courts from the arbitrary and inefficient control of the legislature over 
their rules of procedure has come strongly into the foreground, and it may 
be said, I think, thai: there is at the present time a strong current of public 
opinion setting in the direction of procedure by rules of court. The Board 
of Statutory Consolidation of New York reported in favor of the adoption 
of such a system in 1915. Colorado (Laws Ig13, Ch. 121), Virginia (Laws 
l9I6, Ch. 521), and Alabama (Laws 1915, No. 537), have recently enacted 
legislation looking toward the same end. And there is now pending in the 
Congress of the United States legislation putting the entire procedure on the 
law side of the federal courts under the control of the rule making au-
thority of the Supreme Court. (H. R 7572.) 
In view of the wide-spread dissatisfaction with legislative systems of 
procedure, and the definite trend toward court control which is apparent in 
this country, a book for American readers upon the rule-making power of 
the English Supreme Court is exceedingly timely The English system is the 
model for all modern efforts toward court-made procedure in this country, 
and only by a study of the English rules can one become familiar with the 
possibilities of the system and the progress which has been made under it. 
The book under review is the best, and one might almost say the only, 
treatment of the subject from the viewpoint of the American lawyer. The 
author treats the subject historically, and traces the gradual growth, through 
forty years, of the English system of judicial control of procedure. The di-
rection in wh~ch that development has been the most fruitful, the imperfec-
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tions which were gradually eliminated by changing old rules and intro-
ducing new ones, the vast ingenuity displayed by the judges in discarding 
outgrown precedents and in constantly holding the practice abreast of the 
exacting demands of the day, are all set before the reader in a most scholarly 
and interesting way. It might be regretted that the author has hot found 
it advisable to argue more agressively the availability of the fundamental 
principles of the ~nglish system to the needs of the United States. Mis-
sionary work along this line seems to the writer of this review a duty in-
cumbent upon all who are qualified to undertake it. But one must, of course, 
set limits to any book, and within the limits adopted, Mr. Rosenbaum has 
performed a real service. The dissemination of information about the highly 
successful cot1rt-ru1e system of procedure will of itself constitute an ef-
fective propaganda in its favor, and will help to ed11cate the American public 
to demand something better than the technical and cumbersome procedure 
which has long tended to make every American law suit a contest of en-
durance. EnsoN R SuNn~RI.AND. 
MAGNA CARTA AND OTH~R Ann~ss~s, by William D. Guthrie, New York. 
Columbia University Press, 1916; pp. 282. 
Some time ago an English historian whose studies of Domesday Book are 
a monument to erudition and exact research spoke somewhat disparagingly 
of excursions into history by lawyers. To his mind it too often involved a 
desertion of science for mere superstition, with the result that legal history 
became not a presentation of facts as they were, but what some bygone 
judge or writer supposed the facts to have been. And in conclusion he 
said he could but "gaze in wonder at great intellects bowing themselves in 
homage before the blunders of the past, acute minds submitting to the 
fetish worship of 'our books' and helpless in the presence of what I have 
termed 'the long ju-ju 0£ the law'." The address which gives title to the 
present voltlme is s~rcely a good answer to this stringent critidstrt. 
Mr. Guthrie has sought to perpetuate the numerous myths which have 
grown up round the Great Charter. For there is a purely fictitious Magna 
Carta. During the struggles between parliament and the first two Stuarts, 
perhaps through the influence of Coke, it seized the popular imagination and 
became to the free Englishman the fundamental guarantee of his liberties. 
This notion was further developed and fastened upon English lawyers by 
certain writers, notably Blackstone, in the uncritical eighteenth century, Now 
this would be harmless enough were it not that it attributes to the charter 
what is in reality the slow and painful development of six hundred years. 
Of this traditional view Mr. Guthrie is an exponent. He assumes that 
the .charter was a great popular document because it was exacted from a 
king. To him the principle of Habeas Corpus is implicit in it and he even 
goes so far as to say that "the idea that the fundamental laws of the land 
* * * were urtalterable and that any governmental regulation or edict to the 
contrary should be treated as void and null is plainly enuns:iated in the first 
chapter of Magna Carta." Of course Mr. Guthrie knows that despite some 
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dicta and the strange doubtful case of Dr. Bonham the English courts have 
never assumed the power of declaring a statute void because it conflicted 
with any provision of Magna Carta. But one passes from one surprise to 
another. ]udicimu pariitm of chapter' 39 refers to trial by jury and le.r terrae 
means "the law of the land" or "due process of Ja\v." This is to perpetuate 
an error that even Coke did not make. Probably of the whole charter no 
single clause is more distinctly reactionary, and in after days these words 
were worshipped because, as Maitland has pointed out, it was possible to 
misunderstand them. In brief Mr. Guthrie takes the position that in Magna 
Carta we have an enunciation of fundamental principles which is valuable 
for all time. This rests upon the assumption that there is no substantial 
difference between the social structure of the thirteenth century and that of 
today; moreover it treats law as something static instead of a growing living 
organism. 
In th.e remaining nine addresses Mr. Guthrie shows to better advantage. 
A sturdy conservative, an able defender of the courts in the face of popular 
criticism, he combines unusual power of exposition with a style which even 
the most controversial subject cannot rob of its urbanity. He is a vigorous 
defender of the older conception of constitutional law; he would maintain 
our political institutions in stat1' quo. Naturally he attacks such innovations 
as the Workmen's Compensation Act, the referendum, the recall of judges, 
etc. With much that Mr. Guthrie says the reviewer is in sympathy but, as 
already indicated, he cannot accept the general point of view. If our legal 
system is to survive the stress of present conditions, it must be through 
the efforts of lawyers who combine an intelligent knowledge of the past with 
vision for the future. And in view of the eminence of Mr. Guthrie's position 
one has the greater regret that his convictions should lead him to assume 
the role of la11dator temporis acti. WILLARD BARBOUR. 
Vo'.rING TRusTs: A CHAPTER IN RECENT CORPORATE HISTORY, by Harry A. 
Cushing, of the New York Bar, New York. The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1915; pp. 215. 
This book discusses the subject of Voting Trusts under the titles of the 
significance of Voting Trusts, their contents, and the law relating _thereto, 
together with forms thereof. 
Under the first part there is traced a history of the subject and some of 
the advantages and disadvantages and the most usual terms of such trusts 
are pointed out. 
The second part is an extensive review of the important provisions in a 
very large number of recent Voting Trusts, and the third part reviews in 
a rapid way the decisions relating to the subject, and points out the different 
views of the courts in reference to the policy and validity of Voting Trusts. 
Mr. Cushing is unquestionably favorably inclined toward such trusts so 
long as their purpose is not clearly illegal; he points out wherein they have 
been and usually are beneficial, especially in the reorganization of corpora-
tions and the adoption of a policy that is likely to insure success through a 
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series of years. He, however, also notes that there have been some cases 
in which these desirable results have not been attained. The forms given in-
clude four complete voting trust agreements, many special provisions included 
in trust certificates, and the provisions for the extension and termination of 
such trust agreements. 
This· will be found of value to any one who is interested in drawing up 
documents for purposes of this kind, and fo part II there is described the 
business side 0:£ the matter, as it has actually been worked out in many cases. 
The book will be valuable to any lawyer who has need of information upon 
the legal phases of the questioil, and will also furnish interesting reading for 
the layman who is anxious to learn something of the process of control of 
corporations by such methods. H. L. Wwms. 
Tar: .AD11UNIS'tRA'tION oF Jus'tICE IN CRIMINAL MA't'tERS (IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES), by G. Glover Alexander, M.A., LL.M. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1915; pp. x, 235. 
The preface of this small work tells us that "it is intended as a first book 
for newly appointed justices of the peace, superior police officers, and law 
students; that it is hoped that it will also appeal to a larger class of general 
readers who are interested in subjects bordering on the domain of law, his-
tory, politics and sociology:" Hardy as that broad purpose seems, it is fairly 
accomplished, for, while readers other than justices, police officers, and law 
students, of England, will "find that some of the material is not grist for 
their mills, the mechanical construction of the book will facilitate the process 
of selection. 
Parts I and II deal with the judicial administration of criminal law, the 
organization of the courts and the procedure therein, particular attention 
being given to the justice of the peace. Part III deals with the relation of 
the executive to crime-the prerogative of mercy, extradition, police, prisons, 
etc. Part IV contains a discussion of some recent legislation, dealing with 
parole, and with special classes of offenders, children, lunatics, and habitual 
criminals, together with some meager statistics of crime. 
It is obviously impossible to cover such a broad field as is indicated by 
this synopsis with any fullness of detail. Yet, in spite of this the outstanding 
feature of the work is its realism. To the lawyer, especially, who so seldom 
finds in his professional literature anything except the positive rules of law, 
with reasoning more or less technical and artificial in justification of the 
rules, it will be almost a shock to read this author's practical discussion of 
the actual working of the English criminal law. The following illustrates the 
point: "The jury have a right to return a general verdict of Guilty or Not 
Guilty; and that being the case, however legislators and lawyers may define 
and refine as to the legal distinction between murder and manslaughter, and 
however well an intelligent jury may appreciate the subtle differences be-
tween them, as lucidly explained by a learned judge, it always remains open 
to the jury so to find the facts as to bring the case under either head. Hence 
it has been said that murder is a crime for which a jury of twelve of his 
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fellow countrymen unanimously think that a man ought to be hanged, and 
manslaughter is a crime for which such a jury think he ought not to be 
hanged, but to receive some lesser degree of punishment. Only so are the 
dry bones of malice prepense articulated into a working system, yet how sel-
dom are we presented with anything more than the bones. 
EDGAR N. DURFEE .. 
THI> LA w OJ! ELECTRICITY, by Arthur F. Curtis of the New York Bar, Albany, 
N. Y. Matthew _Bender & Co., 1915; pp. lxxxiv, 1033· 
The author realizes that he is not dealing with any recognized branch 
of i urisprudence. Rather he follows the legal problems arising by rea-
son of the use of electricity through many branches of the law, stich_ as 
contracts, torts, corporations, municipal corporations and many others. The 
fundamental principles of these subjects are largely assumed, except as 
they may find special application in cases involving or growing out of the 
use of electricity. In this manner the author undertakes to include dis-
cussion of electrolysis, electrical injuries, powers, duties and regulation of 
electrical companies, eminent domain, taxation, electrical contracts, municipal 
ownership, abutting owners, interference with currents, injuries to appliances, 
conduits, street railways, master and servant and e".idence. As possibly more 
than half of the decisions have been rendered in the last ten years, the 
timeliness of a collection and discussion of these cases in a single volume 
is apparent. The work covers the decisions of the United States, England 
and Canada. Enwm C. GODDARD. 
